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Disability or Identity?
STUTTERING, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION,
AND THE RIGHT TO SPEAK DIFFERENTLY AT
WORK
INTRODUCTION
More than three million Americans stutter,1 and
stuttering affects about 1 percent of the worldwide population.2
Stuttering refers to involuntary interruptions in a person’s
speech, where speech “is broken by repetitions (li-li-like this),
prolongations (lllllike this), or abnormal stoppages (no sound) of
sounds and syllables.”3 The cause of stuttering is unknown,4 and
no cure for the condition has been found.5 Stuttering ranges in
degree from mild to severe, and it often leads to “physical
tension and struggle” in the speech muscles.6 Significantly, most
people who stutter7 experience feelings of embarrassment,
anxiety, and fear.8

1

Another term for stuttering is stammering. Stuttering Facts and Information,
STUTTERING FOUND., http://www.stutteringhelp.org/Default.aspx?tabid=17 (last updated
Jan. 20, 2011).
2
Id.
3
Id. These are not the only patterns of stuttering. See Stuttering Info, What
Is Stuttering?, NAT’L STUTTERING ASS’N, http://www.nsastutter.org/stutteringinformation/
generalinformation.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
4
Stuttering Info, What Causes Stuttering?, NAT’L STUTTERING ASS’N,
http://www.nsastutter.org/stutteringinformation/generalinformation.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2011). It is not caused by emotional problems or nervousness. Id. A recent
study, however, suggests that genetics may play a role. Stephanie Smith, Unlocking a
Medical Mystery: Stuttering, CNN (Feb. 10, 2010, 5:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/HEALTH/02/10/stuttering.genes.cell/.
5
Stuttering Info, What Help Is Available?, NAT’L STUTTERING ASS’N,
http://www.nsastutter.org/stutteringinformation/generalinformation.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2011).
6
Stuttering Info, What Is Stuttering?, supra note 3.
7
In this note, the terms stutterer and person who stutters will be used
interchangeably. For an insightful piece that discusses these terms as labels, see John
C. Harrison, Are You or Are You Not a Stutterer?, STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (May 1,
1996), http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/kuster/Infostuttering/stuttererornot.html; see also
MARTY JEZER, STUTTERING: A LIFE BOUND UP IN WORDS 16-20 (1997).
8
Stuttering Info, What Is Stuttering?, supra note 3.
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Employment discrimination is a major concern for
stutterers.9 Several studies indicate that people who stutter are
disadvantaged in the employment context.10 According to 85
percent of employers in one study, “stuttering decreases a
person’s employability and opportunities for promotion.”11
According to vocational rehabilitation counselors, who train
individuals to enter the workforce, stuttering is “handicapping.”12
Because stutterers are concerned with discrimination they
might face in the workplace, this note considers the extent to
which stuttering is covered under federal antidiscrimination
statutes. One way to proscribe discrimination based on
stuttering is to consider stuttering a disability under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as amended in 2008;13
another way is through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14
Congress would need to amend the Civil Rights Act to
accomplish this. This note examines both of these possibilities.
This note argues that the federal government should
ban discrimination based on stuttering. This note also argues
that the law must carefully contemplate the nature of
stuttering; in crafting stuttering antidiscrimination law,
policymakers must acknowledge the population of stutterers
who do not stutter often but who are still greatly limited by
their stuttering, and they must determine how to provide legal
protection for these individuals.15 Either of the two alternatives
mentioned above can solve this problem, and this note will
demonstrate how both of these solutions might play out.
Ultimately, while coverage under Title VII would be more
extensive, coverage under the amended ADA is more practical.
Part I of this note explains what stuttering is, including
the physical and emotional components of stuttering. Part I
also describes the common misconceptions of stuttering and
documents why workplace discrimination based on stuttering
is a problem that needs to be addressed. Part II discusses the
9

William D. Parry, Fighting Employment Discrimination for People Who
Stutter⎯Under the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, STUTTERING & LAW,
http://www.stutterlaw.com/adaaa.htm (last updated July 14, 2010).
10
Id.
11
Id. (citing M.I. Hurst & E.B. Cooper, Employer Attitudes Toward
Stuttering, 8 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 1 (1983)).
12
Id. (citing M.I. Hurst & E.B. Cooper, Vocational Rehabilitation Counselors’
Attitudes Toward Stuttering, 8 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 13 (1983)).
13
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp.
II 2009).
14
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 §§ U.S.C. 2000a-2000h-6 (2006).
15
See infra Part I.

2012]

DISABILITY OR IDENTITY?

1181

original ADA, explaining why it was passed and the statutory
scheme through which to bring a discrimination claim. Part II
also documents cases involving stuttering discrimination
claims that have been brought under the ADA as well as
Supreme Court cases in which the ADA’s definition of disability
was interpreted narrowly. Part III analyzes the ADA
Amendments Act (ADAAA), the purposes of the amendments,
and how the amendments affect stuttering discrimination
claims. Part IV describes how it would be possible for an
employee to bring a stuttering discrimination claim under the
amended ADA. In Part V, this note proposes an alternative
way to view stuttering—as an element of one’s personhood and
identity, rather than as a disability. Under this identity model,
stuttering discrimination would be covered under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. Part V goes on to compare the two
characterizations of stuttering and concludes that, although
the identity model is more effective in obtaining stuttering
discrimination coverage under the law, viewing stuttering as a
disability is the more realistic path to coverage.
I.

OVERVIEW OF STUTTERING: SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND,
STEREOTYPES, AND EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION

Stuttering is complex and variable (in kind and degree),
and this contributes to misunderstanding and prejudice
against stutterers. This part describes what stuttering is and
highlights both the physical and emotional aspects of the
condition. In documenting the common stereotypes of
stutterers, this part demonstrates how these misconceptions
limit employment opportunities for people who stutter.
Ultimately, this part shows that employment discrimination
based on stuttering is a widespread problem. It also describes
the emotional element of stuttering, which courts and
lawmakers should consider in order to adequately combat
stuttering discrimination in the workplace.
A.

Stuttering as a Physical and an Emotional Condition

There are two major components of stuttering that must
both be analyzed to determine a person’s severity of
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stuttering.16 First, there is the physical or behavioral
part⎯what an outside observer can perceive.17 Second, there is
the emotional part, which is characterized by a stutterer’s
feelings and attitudes about stuttering.18 Severity—or how
much someone is limited by stuttering—is the sum of both of
these physical and emotional factors for any one person and is
therefore highly individualized.19
The physical or behavioral characteristics of stuttering
are important because they describe the actual disfluency that
the outside listener can hear.20 Factors included in this analysis
are how often moments of stuttering occur, how long they last,
how much struggle is involved with them, and the types of
disfluencies that are involved.21 Many people think of a severe
stutterer as someone who has frequent moments of stuttering
that tend to last a long period of time (numerous seconds).22
The emotional aspects of stuttering, though, also play a
large role in assessing a stutterer’s severity⎯the actual extent
to which a person is affected by stuttering.23 Emotional issues do
not cause stuttering; rather, they are often an effect of
stuttering.24 People who stutter often have feelings associated
with their stuttering, such as nervousness, anxiety, fear,
frustration, shame, and guilt.25 But people who stutter also have
certain attitudes associated with stuttering—that stuttering is
bad or wrong, or that stuttering is a sign of weakness and

Stephen Hood & Chris Roach, I’ve Got a Secret⎯and It’s Scaring Me to
Death! (The Story of a Covert Stutterer), STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (Aug. 18, 2001),
http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/isad4/papers/hood.html.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. Regarding word choice, this note will not often use the terms mild,
moderate, and severe to refer to degree of stuttering because the terms are misleading.
This note will instead discuss how often someone physically gets into a stuttering block
by using terms that refer to the frequency of stuttering. For example, a way to discuss
degrees of stuttering is to say that some people stutter frequently, while for other
individuals it is barely noticeable. When this note does refer to mild or severe
stuttering, though, assume that this is a reference to frequency of overt stuttering
unless otherwise noted.
20
Id.
21
Id.; see also Barry Yeoman, Wrestling with Words, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
Nov./Dec. 1998, at 42, 44 (describing how for some stutterers the condition “means an
intense and visible struggle to force individual syllables through their lips, a phenomenon
that is physically exhausting for the speaker and mentally awkward for the listener”).
22
Hood & Roach, supra note 16.
23
Id.
24
Stuttering Info, What Is Stuttering?, supra note 3; Stuttering Info, What
Causes Stuttering?, supra note 4.
25
Hood & Roach, supra note 16.
16
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failure.26 People who have infrequent moments of stuttering as
well as these feelings and attitudes often consciously try not to
have a physical block whenever possible.27 If they are successful
at avoiding physical blocks, the emotional aspects of stuttering
may increasingly affect them; in this way, the severity of their
stuttering conditions would be higher than observable.28
Some people are so successful at hiding the physical
aspects of stuttering that they become covert stutterers; they
are able to hide their stuttering to such a great extent—
through various tricks and crutches—that they are able to pass
as fluent speakers.29 Covert stutterers pay an insufferable price,
though, because they fear the constant risk of being exposed.30
One covert stutterer described the cost of hiding: “Constant
terror! Fear, panic and anxiety lived with me every waking
minute and even into sleep. Thoughts of discovery paralyzed
me.”31 This demonstrates the inaccuracy of describing a covert
stutterer as having a mild problem.32 Crucial to this
understanding is that there is not only an emotional aspect to
stuttering but that it can actually serve to reduce the frequency
of actual physical stuttering blocks.33 In other words, the
emotional aspect can lead an individual to use extremely
emotionally taxing behaviors to disguise the physical aspect.
Every person stutters with different levels of physical
and emotional severity.34 An accurate analysis of how much a
26

Id.; see also Yeoman, supra note 21, at 44 (explaining that stutterers know
“what it’s like to feel defective, to break a parent’s heart, to have trouble navigating the
social milieu of the schoolyard”).
27
Hood & Roach, supra note 16.
28
Id.
29
Id. Covert stutterers substitute words and feign ignorance to such an
extent that sometimes even their family members do not know their secret. Yeoman,
supra note 21, at 44.
30
Hood & Roach, supra note 16; see also Terry Dartnall, Passing as Fluent,
STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (2003), http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/isad6/papers/dartnall6.html
(The author, a covert stutterer, describes the downside of covert stuttering: “The higher
we fly, the harder we fall. The more fluent we appear to be⎯and are, for long
periods⎯the harder it is when we land on our backsides.” But the author also describes
the upside of being covert⎯not stuttering publicly⎯and does not ultimately fully endorse
or condemn covert stuttering.).
31
Hood & Roach, supra note 16; see also Yeoman, supra note 21, at 44
(describing the psychological fear and anxiety that covert stutterers experience).
32
Hood & Roach, supra note 16; see also supra note 19.
33
Hood & Roach, supra note 16.
34
Id. One way of demonstrating this is through the analogy of an iceberg.
Russ Hicks, The Iceberg Analogy of Stuttering, STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (Aug. 18, 2003),
http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/isad6/papers/hicks6.html. In an iceberg, the visible
amount of ice above the water’s surface is much smaller than the amount of ice that is
below the surface. Id. The above-the-water part of the stuttering iceberg is the physical
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person is affected by stuttering would include an assessment of
both the physical and emotional aspects.35 This is a widely held
view in the field of speech pathology.36 Moreover, this
background knowledge is crucial to fully understanding the
next section’s discussion of stuttering in the workplace.
B.

Stuttering Stereotypes and Their Relation to Stuttering
in the Workplace

People who stutter are subject to society’s widespread
negative stereotypes about stuttering.37 There is a widespread
belief that stutterers as a group “exhibit certain negative
personality traits such as being shy, quiet, nervous, tense,
afraid, self-conscious, etc.”38 Moreover, there are common myths
that people who stutter are not as intelligent as those who are
fluent39 and that underlying nervousness causes stuttering.40
Stuttering in the workplace is a significant issue for people
who stutter.41 A large study of employers’ attitudes toward
stuttering conducted in 1983 demonstrates employers’ widespread
negative attitudes toward people who stutter: 30 percent of
employers thought that stuttering interferes with job
performance, 40 percent thought it negatively affects promotion
possibilities, 44 percent thought that stutterers should seek
employment that does not require a lot of speaking, and 85
percent thought that stuttering decreases employability to at
least some degree.42 In a 1994 survey of people who stutter, 16
percent of the stutterers had been told that they would not be
hired because of their stuttering, more than half thought that
their supervisor had misjudged their capabilities because of
stuttering, and more than one-third received negative

aspect of stuttering, while the below-the-surface part is the emotional aspect. Id. Not
only is this emotional part invisible, but it is often larger than the physical part. Id.
35
Hood & Roach, supra note 16.
36
See J. Scott Yaruss, Assessing Quality of Life in Stuttering Treatment Outcomes
Research, 35 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 190, 190 (2010) (noting how “stuttering can involve far
more than just observable speech disfluencies” and citing a plethora of sources).
37
Michael P. Boyle et al., Effects of Perceived Causality on Perceptions of
Persons Who Stutter, 34 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 201, 204 (2009).
38
Id.
39
Stuttering:
Answers
for
Employers,
STUTTERING
FOUND.,
http://www.stutteringhelp.org/Default.aspx?tabid=13 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
40
Stuttering Info, What Causes Stuttering?, supra note 4.
41
Joseph F. Klein & Stephen B. Hood, The Impact of Stuttering on Employment
Opportunities and Job Performance, 29 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 255, 256 (2004).
42
Id. (citing Hurst and Cooper, supra note 11, at 1).
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performance evaluations because of stuttering.43 A 2004 survey
also documented that people who stutter believe that their
stuttering is a “major handicap” in their working lives.44 More
than 70 percent of the stutterers surveyed thought that they had
a decreased opportunity to be hired and promoted than
nonstutterers, and 69 percent believed that their past job
performance was hindered because of stuttering.45
II.

THE ORIGINAL AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
BACKGROUND AND CASES INVOLVING STUTTERING

One possible way to deal with employment
discrimination based on stuttering is through the federal statute
that protects employees who have disabilities, the Americans
with Disabilities Act.46 This part begins by discussing Congress’s
purpose in passing the Act, and it continues by describing how
an employee may bring a discrimination claim under the ADA.
Several employees who stutter have brought ADA claims
against their employers, but these claims have been largely
unsuccessful. One significant reason for this lack of success is
that the U.S. Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted certain
key provisions of the ADA regarding the definition of disability.
Ultimately, this part demonstrates that while there was once
some likelihood that the ADA would cover stuttering, by the
early 2000s the Supreme Court had significantly limited the
probability that the ADA would adequately cover claims of
discrimination based on stuttering.
A.

Purpose of the ADA

According to Congress, the ADA is meant to counter
discrimination faced by people with disabilities who “have often
had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.”47
Congress found that discrimination against people with
43

Id. at 257 (citing M. Rice and R. Kroll, A Survey of Stutterers’ Perceptions
of Challenges and Discrimination in the Workplace, in STUTTERING: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIRST WORLD CONGRESS ON FLUENCY DISORDERS, II 559 (C.W. Starkweather &
H.F.M. Peters eds., 1994)).
44
Id. at 266.
45
Id.
46
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. II 2009). This note focuses on
Title I, which deals with employment discrimination. Id. § 12112. There are two other main
parts to the ADA. Title II prohibits discrimination in public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12132
(2006). Title III proscribes discrimination in public accommodations. Id. § 12182.
47
Id. § 12101(a)(4).
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disabilities was not only a historical problem but a problem
that continues to affect American society in a “persist[ent]” and
“pervasive” way, too often according people with disabilities “an
inferior status in our society.”48 President George H. W. Bush
stated that the ADA would “signal[] the end to the unjustified
segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the
mainstream of American life.”49 While the existing
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 had been effective, its area of
coverage was limited and it “left broad areas of American life
untouched or inadequately addressed.”50
B.

Framework of the ADA

There are several steps to determining discrimination
based on disability under the ADA.51 Courts apply the McDonell
Douglas52 test, which is the standard for most discrimination
litigation.53 To be successful, the employee must first satisfy
three requirements to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. First, the claimant must establish disability.54
Under the ADA, there are three different ways an individual
can show disability, any one of which is enough to establish
that a disability exists.55 A plaintiff can establish the presence
of a disability if the condition fits within the statutory
48

Id. §§ 12101(a)(2)-(3), (6).
President George H.W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, reprinted in 1 DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, PUBLIC LAW
101-336, at 1166 (Bernard D. Reams Jr. et al. eds., 1992).
50
Id. at 1165. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first federal handicap
discrimination statute. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-94a (2006). It had only a limited effect,
though, because it applied just to the federal government, federal contractors, and
federal grant recipients. Larry M. Schumaker, The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 47 J. MO. B. 542, 542 (1991). Conversely, the ADA has a significantly wider
impact on employment: it covers all public and private employers with fifteen or more
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Congress defined disability under the ADA in the
same way that handicap was defined in the Rehabilitation Act, and Congress expected
the ADA definition to be applied consistently with the definition in the Rehabilitation
Act. Schumaker, supra, at 543. While this note does not focus on the Rehabilitation Act
because of the ADA’s wider scope, the Rehabilitation Act is relevant, and this note will
refer to it and its case law where appropriate.
51
Andresen v. Fuddruckers, Inc., No. Civ. 03-3294 DWF/SRN, 2004 WL
2931346, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2004).
52
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
53
GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 37 (3d ed. 2010). In fact, the ADA was modeled on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 229; Drew S. Days, III, “Feedback Loop”: The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Its Progeny, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 981, 992 (2005).
54
Andresen, 2004 WL 2931346, at *4.
55
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. II 2009).
49
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definition of a disability—“a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more [of an individual’s] major
life activities.”56 An employee can also establish the presence of
a disability if there is “a record of such an impairment” as
denoted in the above statutory definition.57 The third way an
individual can show disability is if he or she is “regarded as
having such an impairment.”58 Here, regarded as means that
the employer (the person who took the adverse⎯and
potentially discriminatory⎯employment action) is the one who
is regarding (perceiving) the individual as having a disability
(even if the person does not actually have a disability).
Assuming that a claimant can establish that a disability exists
under one of these three possibilities, the next part of the
prima facie case requirement is to determine whether the
person is “qualified to perform the essential functions of the
job, with or without reasonable accommodation.”59 The third
and final element necessary to establish a prima facie case is
that the employee suffers an “adverse employment action”
because of the disability.60 If the claimant can establish a prima
facie case, a burden-shifting analysis ensues. The employer can
rebut this presumption of discrimination “by articulating a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.”61 If the employer can do this, the burden
then shifts back to the plaintiff “to demonstrate that the
employer’s non-discriminatory reason is pretextual.”62
C.

Stuttering Cases Under the ADA

Several cases decided prior to the ADAAA held
stuttering is not a disability. The principal reason for
interpretation was that the plaintiffs failed to claim
stuttering was a significant obstacle in their lives.
example, in Zhong v. Tallahatchie General Hospital
56

that
this
that
For
and

Id. § 12102(1)(A). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(EEOC) regulations refer to this prong as “actual disability” in order to distinguish it
from the other two prongs (not to suggest that this prong brings with it greater rights).
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, As Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 16,980 (Mar. 25, 2011). This note will
use this term where appropriate to avoid confusion.
57
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B).
58
Id. § 12102(1)(C).
59
Andresen, 2004 WL 2931346, at *4.
60
Id.
61
Id. (quoting Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1999)).
62
Id. (quoting Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1135).
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Extended Care Facility, a hospital said that it fired a medical
technologist because he was incompetent.63 The fired employee
filed several discrimination claims, one of which was an
allegation that he was improperly terminated under the ADA
because of his stutter.64 The District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi dismissed the claim because the
plaintiff, in his deposition, described his stuttering as “very
mild, very, very mild” and occurring “[o]nly occasionally.”65
Plaintiff also testified that his stuttering did not affect his work
and that he was able to perform his required tasks “‘without
a[n] accommodation.’”66 In granting summary judgment to the
defendant, the court stated that, based on plaintiff’s own
testimony, plaintiff’s stuttering clearly did not substantially
limit his ability to speak or work and, further, that he had not
shown that defendant regarded him as having a disability.67
The court in Preacely v. Schulte Roth & Zabel similarly
held that stuttering is not a disability. There, a legal word
processor was fired because the law-firm employer said that he
“ma[de] his co-workers feel uncomfortable and unsafe” due to
his inappropriate comments and drawings.68 The plaintiff
claimed stuttering discrimination in violation of the ADA.69 In
affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
law firm, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted that
the former employee “admitted that his stutter was neither a
physical nor a mental disability . . . and that it did not interfere
with his ability to work or talk.”70
The court’s decision in Detko v. Blimpies Restaurant
also involved denial of a stuttering discrimination claim—
albeit under Title III of the ADA, which involves claims
regarding discrimination by private entities in public
accommodations, rather than a discrimination claim under
Title I.71 The plaintiff, a customer of defendant Blimpies
63

Zhong v. Tallahatchie Gen. Hosp. & Extended Care Facility, No. 2:98CV44JAD, 1999 WL 33227442, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 28, 1999).
64
Id.
65
Id. at *3.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Preacely v. Schulte Roth & Zabel, 17 F. App’x 57, 58 (2d Cir. 2001).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 58-59.
71
Detko v. Blimpies Rest., 924 F. Supp. 555, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Detko is
still relevant because the same definition of disability in Title I applies to Titles II and
III of the ADA, and whether the plaintiff was disabled was the issue in the case. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. II 2009).
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Restaurant, filed a claim of discrimination on the basis of his
stuttering after an incident that occurred when he attempted to
order a sandwich in the restaurant.72 The facts, as alleged by the
plaintiff, are particularly interesting. He claimed that he tried to
order a sandwich with extra mayonnaise and stuttered on the
word “mayonnaise.”73 The employee serving him, who turned out
to be the store’s manager, yelled at him to “[h]urry it up,” and
the customer “became embarrassed and distressed.”74 After the
manager stopped preparing the customer’s sandwich, the
customer asked to speak with the manager to file a complaint.75
Meanwhile, another employee served the customer the
sandwich.76 The manager refused to identify himself, threw the
sandwich in the trash, grabbed the plaintiff “by the neck[,] and
dragged him out of the restaurant.”77 The court granted
Blimpie’s motion to dismiss because the customer did “not
allege[] that his impediment substantially limit[ed] his
speaking or that he is regarded as having such an
impairment. . . . [H]e merely allege[d] that he stutters, and has
particular difficulty with the letter ‘M.’”78
In Zhong, Preacely, and Detko, the courts hearing the
cases did not find stuttering to be a disability under the ADA.
But, these results may be attributable to the fact that each of
the three plaintiffs failed to allege that stuttering was a
substantial limitation—or admitted outright that it was not.
Thus, these plaintiffs do not appear to be exemplars by which
to determine stuttering’s status under the ADA.
The court in Andresen v. Fuddruckers, Inc. sent a strong
signal that stuttering could be covered under the ADA if a
plaintiff could demonstrate that her stuttering was severe.79
Fuddruckers restaurant terminated the plaintiff’s employment
after sixteen years of service.80 While the restaurant claimed that
the former employee was fired for poor performance and for
drooling and spitting into food, plaintiff “allege[d] that she was
fired because she stutter[ed].”81 The court denied Fuddruckers’s
72

Detko, 924 F. Supp. at 556.
Id.
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 557 (second emphasis added).
79
Andresen v. Fuddruckers, Inc., No. Civ. 03-3294 DWF/SRN, 2004 WL
2931346, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2004).
80
Id. at *1.
81
Id.
73
74
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motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of fact as
to whether plaintiff’s “stuttering constitute[d] a ‘disability’ under
the ADA.”82 Plaintiff claimed that her stuttering was severe, and
that she avoided saying certain words and sounds and entering
into speaking situations; she also alleged that she had difficulty
speaking in general, especially when communicating with
strangers and on the telephone, and that people had difficulty
understanding her.83 A speech pathologist confirmed that her
stuttering was severe.84 Also, the former employee sometimes had
excess saliva that, according to her, only happened when she
stuttered.85 Notwithstanding her stuttering and saliva issues,
Andresen enjoyed a lengthy, successful term of employment with
Fuddruckers until new managers took over the restaurant.86
Plaintiff’s “evidence [was] sufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact that her stuttering [was] severe and that it substantially
limit[ed] her ability to speak.”87 In its analysis, the court examined
Zhong and Preacely and distinguished them on their facts. Those
precedents did “not persuade the Court that [plaintiff’s] stuttering
[could not], as a matter of law, constitute a disability.”88 The court
also determined “that a triable issue of fact exist[ed] as to
whether Andresen was qualified to do her job . . . [and] whether
she was terminated because of her stuttering.”89
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(Commission or EEOC) decision in Manning v. United States
Postal Service also demonstrates that stuttering can be
considered a disability.90 The complainant, Robert Manning,
described his stuttering as severe.91 He said that he could not
speak in public and was embarrassed to take classes.92 Manning
claimed that he noticed derogatory graffiti on the stalls in two
men’s restrooms: the writing mocked his stuttering.93 Although
Manning noticed the graffiti in late winter or early spring 2000
82

Id. at *6, *8.
Id. at *1.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at *1-3.
87
Id. at *6.
88
Id. at *6 & n.10 (noting that the plaintiffs in Zhong and Preacely both
admitted that they do not stutter frequently).
89
Id. at *6-7.
90
Manning, E.E.O.C. Dec. 01A42153, 2004 WL 1810386, at *1 (Aug. 5, 2004).
This case was before the Commission under the Rehabilitation Act, as Manning worked
for a federal agency. Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
83
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and discussed the matter with his supervisor, the graffiti was
not cleaned off until October 27, 2000.94 It then reappeared and
remained on the walls until the complainant left the Postal
Service in March 2001.95 A psychiatric evaluation stated that
Manning only stuttered mildly,96 but the Commission reversed
the administrative judge’s ruling of a decision without a
hearing.97 The Commission found a “genuine issue of material
fact” as to whether the complainant was “substantially limited
in the major life activity of speaking.”98 According to the
Commission, a hearing was not only necessary to resolve the
issue of fact, but it was crucial: the hearing would give the
administrative law judge an opportunity to hear how Manning
stuttered.99
This finding connotes the individualized inquiry that
would be done were stuttering considered solely under a
disability theory; stuttering would not be a disability for every
person who stutters, but only if it substantially affects that
person’s speaking.100 So, while not yet finding that Manning’s
stuttering substantially limited his speaking, the Commission
noted that his stuttering could be deemed substantially limiting
if the facts at the hearing bore that out.101 The Commission
further ruled that Manning could possibly be covered under the
regarded-as prong of the definition of disability⎯which protects
against discrimination based on stereotypes⎯if further facts
demonstrated this.102 The Commission noted that stuttering is a
condition that is characterized by stigmatizing stereotypes and
“attitudinal barriers” that can affect a stutterer’s employment
opportunities.103 These stereotypes include the beliefs that people
who stutter are “nervous, shy, quiet, self-conscious, withdrawn,
tense, anxious, fearful and guarded.”104 In sum, then, considering
these pre-ADAAA cases, courts only found stuttering to be a
disability when the physical component of stuttering severely
94

Id.
Id.
96
Id. at *2.
97
Id. at *3.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at *3-4. Note that under the ADAAA, as explained infra, a claimant can
meet the requirements for the regarded-as prong without showing that he or she was
regarded as being substantially limited in a major life activity. See infra Part III.B.3.
103
Manning, 2004 WL 1810386, at *4.
104
Id.
95
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affected an individual. In part, the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the ADA required this narrow definition of
disability, as discussed in the next section.
D.

Supreme Court Cases Limiting the Definition of
Disability Under the ADA
1. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.

In Sutton, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether corrective or mitigating measures must be considered
when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity, the first prong of the ADA test for determining
whether a disability exists.105 The case arose after two sisters
applied for employment with United Air Lines as commercial
airline pilots.106 Both sisters had severe myopia; their eyesight was
poor enough that without corrective lenses, they could not
participate in numerous daily activities.107 However, with glasses
or contact lenses, they could see as well as people who did not
have impaired eyesight.108 After United Air Lines initially invited
them for an interview, it realized that they did not meet the
company’s minimum uncorrected vision requirement.109 United
Air Lines subsequently canceled the interview, and the sisters
filed suit, alleging disability discrimination under the ADA.110
They specifically claimed that “they actually [had] a substantially
limiting impairment or [were] regarded as having such an
impairment.”111 The district court and the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found that they had not stated a claim of disability
within the meaning of the ADA.112
The Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the first
claim and held that if a person is taking measures to correct or
mitigate an impairment, the effects of those measures “must be
taken into account when judging whether that person is
‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus
‘disabled’ under the Act.”113 To reach this result, the Court
105

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481 (1999), superseded by
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
106
Id. at 475.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 476.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 476-77.
113
Id. at 477, 482 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006)).
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looked to three separate provisions of the ADA.114 The Court
first reasoned that the phrase substantially limits applies to
the present, so that a “person whose physical or mental
impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does
not have an impairment that presently ‘substantially limits’ a
major life activity.”115 Next, the Court reasoned that because a
determination of disability under the ADA is an “individualized
inquiry,” judges should examine an individual based on that
person’s actual condition, not general information on how a
group of people with the same impairment is usually affected.116
For the individualized analysis to be accurate, the Court noted
that judges must consider a person’s use of mitigating
measures.117 Finally, the Court looked at the number of people
with disabilities that Congress cited in the ADA—forty-three
million—to conclude that the legislature intended to take a
“functional approach to determining disability” rather than a
nonfunctional approach.118 Therefore, because the plaintiffs
wore corrective lenses, they could not successfully make a
claim that they were substantially limited in any major life
activity.119 The Court in Sutton also provided a strict standard
for the regarded-as prong of the disability definition. In order
to be regarded as disabled, the Court held, the employer must
regard the claimant substantially limited in a major life
activity; thus, even under the regarded-as prong, substantial
limitation is the standard for disability.120
2. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams
Toyota further limits the definition of disability under
the ADA. In Toyota, the Supreme Court needed to interpret the
terms substantially and major to determine whether a person

114

Id. at 482.
Id. at 482-83.
116
Id. at 483.
117
Id. at 483-84.
118
Id. at 484-87. The functional approach does not include people who
successfully use mitigating measures to overcome their limitations. Id. at 485. The
nonfunctional approach, also known as the “health conditions approach,” “looks at all
conditions that impair the health or normal functional abilities of an individual.” Id. at
485, 487. Using this approach, over 160 million Americans would be considered
disabled. Id. at 487.
119
Id. at 488-89.
120
Id. at 491, 493.
115
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was disabled under the ADA.121 The case involved Ella
Williams, who had been employed in an automobile
manufacturing plant by Toyota Motor Manufacturing
(Toyota).122 Over the course of several years, Williams developed
pain and was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and
several other conditions.123 This made it difficult for her to
continue working at Toyota.124 After Williams’s employment
was terminated, she filed suit against her former employer,
claiming that Toyota violated the ADA.125 Williams claimed that
she was disabled because her physical impairments
substantially limited her in six ways,126 each of which she
claimed was a major life activity.127 She also alleged that she
was disabled under the ADA because she had a record of
impairment and because she was regarded as having an
impairment.128 While the district court ruled in favor of Toyota,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and found
that Williams was disabled because she had been substantially
limited in performing manual tasks.129 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari “to consider the proper standard for
assessing whether an individual is substantially limited in
performing manual tasks.”130
In deciding to strictly interpret both substantially and
major, the Supreme Court reversed.131 The Court reasoned that
these terms must be interpreted strictly, in part because of
Congress’s intent, as discussed in Sutton.132 In order to be
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, the Court
held that “an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing
activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
lives [and that t]he impairment’s impact must also be
121

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-97 (2002),
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553, as recognized in Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 582 F. Supp. 2d 326,
341 & n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
122
Id. at 187.
123
Id. at 187-89.
124
Id. at 189-90.
125
Id. at 190.
126
Williams claimed that her physical impairments substantially limited her in
manual tasks, housework, gardening, playing with her children, lifting, and working. Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 190-92.
130
Id. at 192.
131
Id. at 192, 196-97.
132
Id. at 197.
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permanent or long term.”133 Taking into account the
individualized inquiry required by the statute, and also the fact
that symptoms can “vary widely from person to person” with
certain impairments, the Court reasoned that mere evidence of
a medical diagnosis would be “insufficient . . . to prove
disability status;” rather, whether a person has a disability
under the ADA must be based upon the extent of that
individual’s impairment.134 When analyzing the major life
activity of performing manual tasks, the Court stated that the
main question must be whether the individual “is unable to
perform the variety of tasks central to most people’s daily
lives,” not just the tasks associated with that person’s specific
job.135 This was a crucial point because “the manual tasks
unique to any particular job are not necessarily important
parts of most people’s lives.”136 In this case, there were some
manual tasks that Williams was able to do at work, and
outside of work she was able to perform many of the manual
tasks that are central to most people’s daily lives.137 Therefore,
the court of appeals was incorrect to find that Williams was
disabled under the ADA.138
III.

THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT

In response to how the ADA had been interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Sutton and Toyota, Congress passed the
ADA Amendments Act in 2008.139 The Amendments Act
significantly broadened the scope of disability under the ADA.140
After expanding on Congress’s purpose in passing the ADAAA,
this part details the specific changes in the ADAAA and
discusses how each of the changes affects discrimination claims
brought on the basis of stuttering. Taken as a whole, the
ADAAA decreases plaintiffs’ burdens to show that their
stuttering is a disability.
133

Id. at 198.
Id. at 198-99.
135
Id. at 200-01.
136
Id. at 201.
137
Id. at 202.
138
Id. at 203.
139
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission promulgated amended regulations as
well, which became effective on May 24, 2011. Regulations to Implement the Equal
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, As Amended, 76 Fed.
Reg. 16,978, 16,978 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
140
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4, 122 Stat. at 3555.
134
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Congressional Purpose

One of the major purposes of the ADAAA was to place
the emphasis of ADA claims on whether a qualified person has
been discriminated against on the basis of disability, rather
than on the preliminary question of whether a plaintiff is
disabled.141 Congress deemed the definition of disability less
important than the determination of whether covered entities
complied with their obligations not to discriminate.142 The
amended statute embraces a wider-encompassing meaning of
disability, defining the term “in favor of broad coverage of
individuals.”143 Congress removed two original findings from the
ADA because they provided a justification for the Supreme
Court to narrowly construe the definition of disability144: (1)
that there are forty-three million Americans with disabilities,145
and (2) that individuals with disabilities constitute “a discrete
and insular minority.”146 Removing the findings enlarges the
class of individuals that the statute is intended to protect and,
by extension, allows for an increasing number of impairments
to be considered disabilities.147 Moreover, the old ADA
prohibited discrimination against a qualified individual “with a
disability because of the disability of such individual,”148 while
the ADAAA prohibits discrimination against a qualified
individual “on the basis of disability.”149 Therefore, the major
purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for individuals to be

141

Id. at 3554; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2011) (“The primary object of
attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have
complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the
individual meets the definition of disability. The question of whether an individual meets
the definition of disability under this part should not demand extensive analysis.”).
142
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554.
143
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (Supp. II 2009).
144
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3, 122 Stat. at 3554-55.
145
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
146
Id. § 12101(a)(7).
147
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553 (“[L]ower courts
have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a range of substantially
limiting impairments are not people with disabilities . . . .”).
148
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
149
Id. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 2009). This (subtle) change in language⎯specifically,
the removal of “with a disability”⎯further demonstrates the way Congress wanted courts
to more easily dispense with the question of whether an individual is disabled.
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW DISABILITY AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION LAWS 2008, at 23
(Joyce Gentry et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING]. In fact, this language was
structured on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id.
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considered disabled under the statute.150 In and of itself, this
legislative purpose makes it more likely that individuals who
stutter will be protected by the ADAAA.
B.

Specific Changes Under the ADAAA and How They
Relate to Stuttering

The amendments made numerous changes to the ADA.
The changes affect several areas: the definition of substantially
limits, episodic impairments and impairments in remission,
which activities are considered major life activities, effects of
mitigating measures, and the requirements of the regarded-as
prong. Each of these changes has substantial implications
regarding the extent to which stuttering is considered a disability
under the ADA.
1. Speaking as a Major Life Activity
No major life activities were listed in the old ADA.151 The
amended statute, though, provides a nonexhaustive list of
activities.152 Under the ADAAA, speaking is explicitly listed as a
major life activity.153 In our society, a limitation on one’s ability
to speak can interfere with life activities in which people
without such limitations regularly engage. Speaking plays a
vital role in communication. If there was any doubt as to the
significance of speaking in people’s daily lives, the statute now
removes the ambiguity. Further, because of the “substantially
limits” requirement, it would not make sense for the statute to
only cover a total inability to speak⎯i.e., muteness. For many
people who stutter, their speech impediment substantially
limits—but does not preclude—their ability to speak. Therefore,
the inclusion of speaking as a major life activity would make it
easier for stuttering to be considered a disability under the ADA.

150

See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554 (stating that the
purpose of the amendments is “to carry out the ADA’s objectives . . . by reinstating a
broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA”).
151
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (disability is defined, but no list is given);
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 149, at 21. The EEOC did promulgate a regulatory definition,
though, and speaking was on that list. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2010) (amended 2011).
152
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
153
Id.
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2. Substantially Limits: A Less Demanding Standard
The ADAAA establishes that the substantially limits
requirement was to be construed significantly more broadly
than courts had been interpreting the term.154 Moreover, there
are three specific ways in which substantially limits has
become a more inclusive standard.
First, only one major life activity needs to be
substantially limited for an individual to have a cognizable
disability under the ADAAA.155 Therefore, it would suffice if
stuttering substantially limited speaking without substantially
limiting any other major life activity.
Second, the amended statute provides coverage for
impairments that are episodic or in remission, so long as they
fit the statutory definition of disability when they are active.156
A useful test for determining if an individual’s impairment is
substantially limiting is whether an individual’s activities are
limited in “condition, duration and manner.”157 Stuttering could
be considered episodic because of how the physical stuttering
block does not occur constantly. Sometimes, a person does not
physically stutter for long periods of time; there may be days or
more between stutters.158 This person who stutters only
intermittently would likely be covered under this amendment.
When a person is stuttering, the involuntary interruptions can
substantially limit one’s ability to speak.
Third, the ADAAA states that the use or lack of use of
mitigating or corrective measures cannot be taken into account

154

Id. § 12102(4)(B) (Supp. II 2009) (“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be
interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of
2008.”); ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554. Specifically, one purpose
of the amendments is to convey congressional intent that the standard for
“substantially limits” as articulated in Toyota “has created an inappropriately high
level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA.” Id. Additionally,
Congress found that the EEOC regulations that defined “‘substantially limits’ as
‘significantly restricted’ are inconsistent with congressional intent, by expressing too
high a standard.” Id.
155
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C) (Supp. II 2009) (“An impairment that substantially
limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to be
considered a disability.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(viii) (2011). This is the same as under
the original ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006).
156
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is
a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(vii).
157
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 149, at 18.
158
See Hood & Roach, supra note 16.
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when determining whether or not a person has a disability.159
The statute lists various mitigating measures that cannot be
considered: (1) medication and medical supplies and equipment,
(2) assistive technology, (3) reasonable accommodations or
auxiliary aids or services, or (4) learned behavioral or adaptive
neurological modifications.160
There are several ways—including speech therapy161 and
use of assistive devices162—people can attempt to mitigate their
stuttering. One of the reasons this provision is so important in
relation to stuttering is that each of these measures has
varying levels of effectiveness for each person who uses them.
Just as the cause of stuttering is not understood, what makes
these methods effective is also not understood. In this way, it is
not a person’s fault if these measures do not work to reduce a
person’s stuttering.163 In turn, it would be unfair if the
availability of mitigating factors weighed against considering
stuttering a disability; this would harm those people on whom
these techniques were not effective. Furthermore, some people
who stutter do not believe in using these methods, and it would
be unfortunate to create a situation where—because stuttering
could not be recognized as a disability—there is more pressure
on people who stutter to use these measures because there
would be no other recourse in the workplace.
3. Regarded-As Prong Changed
The ADA amendments both broaden and narrow the
scope of coverage under the regarded-as prong of disability. A
person can now be regarded as having a disability if this
159

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (“The determination of whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the
ameliorative effects of [numerous enumerated] mitigating measures . . . .”); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(vi); see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554
(explicitly noting a purpose of the amendments to reject Sutton, which had held that
impairments need to be determined with regard to mitigating measures).
160
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I)-(IV). Ordinary eyeglasses and contact lenses,
though, can be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits
a major life activity. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(ii).
161
See JEZER, supra note 7, at 68, 76 (noting that there are two different
major approaches to speech therapy, but explaining that “what works in the clinic
doesn’t easily carry over into the real world”).
162
The SpeechEasy is one such tool. What Is SpeechEasy?, SPEECHEASY,
http://www.speecheasy.com/whatisspeecheasy.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). It looks like a
hearing aid and “mimics the choral effect paired with traditional fluency techniques.” Id.;
How It Works, SPEECHEASY, http://www.speecheasy.com/whatisspeecheasy.php (last
visited Jan. 21, 2011).
163
See Stuttering Info, What Causes Stuttering?, supra note 4.
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individual can show discrimination based on an actual or
perceived impairment, even if the impairment does not limit—
or is not perceived to limit—a major life activity.164 In this way,
Congress reinstated the reasoning of School Board of Nassau
County, Florida v. Arline.165
In Arline, an elementary-school teacher was fired after
she suffered a third relapse of tuberculosis in the span of two
years.166 She brought suit, claiming a violation of the
Rehabilitation Act.167 The Supreme Court found that she was a
person with a handicap under the regarded-as prong.168 Under
that part of the definition, the “negative reactions of others” to
an impairment can limit a person’s ability to work.169 In
explaining the regarded-as prong, the Court looked to
congressional intent to reason that “society’s accumulated myths
and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as
are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.”170
Coverage under the regarded-as prong was narrowed
under the amendments, though, in two ways. First,
impairments that are transitory and minor are not covered
under the regarded-as prong.171 Stuttering is permanent, so it
would not be restricted by this provision. Second, and more
importantly in this context, the ADAAA does not require
reasonable accommodations to be made for people who only fit
the definition of disability under the regarded-as prong.172 This
part of the statute resolved a circuit split over whether the
third prong required reasonable accommodations.173
164

42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being
regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has
been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity.” (emphasis added)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
165
480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat.
at 3554 (articulating a purpose of the amendments to reject Sutton’s interpretation of
the regarded-as prong and reinstate the reasoning in Arline).
166
Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 284-86.
169
Id. at 283.
170
Id. at 284.
171
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (Supp. II 2009) (defining transitory as being six
months or less); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2011). But, a transitory impairment can fit the
definition of disability under the actual-disability prong or the record-of prong. Id.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).
172
42 U.S.C. § 12201(h); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(e). Because of this, the EEOC
noted that it is unnecessary to proceed under the actual-disability or record-of prong
when an individual is not seeking a reasonable accommodation; the analysis could then
be made solely under the regarded-as prong. Id. § 1630.2(g)(3).
173
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 149, at 24-25.
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This is quite significant in relation to stuttering because
it addresses the reality that there may be less protection for
people who do not stutter frequently under the actual-disability
prong of disability.174 Under this provision, if a person who
stutters is discriminated against because of stuttering, this
individual can be regarded as having a disability⎯even if
courts would not consider stuttering as limiting the person’s
speaking. This provision seems to allow people who do not
stutter frequently to nevertheless gain protection against
discrimination. Furthermore, and quite significantly, this may
be incentive for people who choose to hide their stuttering⎯by
avoiding speaking situations⎯to speak up, with the knowledge
that (even based on just a few physical blocks) any
discrimination can have a legal remedy.
C.

ADAAA Case Law

In Medvic v. Compass Sign Co., LLC, a Title I case
analyzed under the ADAAA, plaintiff’s claim of discrimination
based on stuttering survived defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.175 The plaintiff, Donald Medvic, was employed as a
sheet-metal mechanic for the defendant, Compass Signs.176
Medvic stuttered, and, although he never asked for an
accommodation, his supervisors were aware of his speech
impediment because they could hear it.177 Medvic was laid off, and
he brought two claims against Compass Signs based on the
ADA—that his termination was due to his stuttering disability,
and that he was subjected to a hostile work environment.178 In
evaluating Compass Signs’s summary-judgment motion, the
court first analyzed whether Medvic was disabled under the

174

The reason for this is that infrequent stuttering may not be viewed as a
substantial limit on speaking. See supra Part I.
175
Medvic v. Compass Sign Co., LLC, Civ. A. No. 10-5222, 2011 WL 3513499,
at *1, *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2011).
176
Id. at *1.
177
Id. at *1-2. The court described Medvic’s stutter as making it difficult for
him to communicate orally and sometimes causing him to be unable to say what he
wants to say for several minutes. Id. at *1. Medvic’s coworkers, at least once, needed to
help him order food while out for dinner. Id. at *2. Medvic accused his supervisors of
making fun of his stuttering. Specifically, he claimed they asked him to sing for them
and would tell him to just spit it out. Id. at *3. But Medvic said that his stutter did not
affect his ability to do his job, and the defendant agreed; once, Medvic’s supervisors
considered warning a customer about his stuttering, but they ultimately chose not to
do so because he “always found his way.” Id.
178
Id. at *1.
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terms of the ADAAA.179 The court found that there was a genuine
issue of fact as to whether Medvic was substantially limited in
communicating: stuttering sometimes delayed his speech for
minutes at a time, stuttering impeded his social life, he stuttered
during his deposition, and his coworkers testified to his
stuttering hindering his ability to communicate.180 The company
argued that, because Medvic sat for his deposition, he could not
have been substantially limited in his ability to communicate,
but the court rejected this argument.181 The court maintained that
Medvic could still be substantially limited in communicating
even if he could communicate effectively sometimes.182 The court
cited the ADAAA for further support.183 Then, the court found
that Medvic also survived summary judgment regarding whether
he was otherwise qualified for the job and whether the company’s
action was taken because of his stuttering.184
IV.

BRINGING A WORKPLACE STUTTERING DISCRIMINATION
CLAIM UNDER THE AMENDED ADA

The ADAAA was intended to make it easier for
claimants to show that they have a disability under the
statutory definition of that term. The amendments do make it
easier for stutterers to show that they have a disability. This
part methodically goes through the statute to document how a
successful stuttering discrimination claim can be brought
under the ADAAA. The analysis will show how applying the
complex nature of stuttering to the definition of disability
under the ADAAA can result in broad antidiscrimination
coverage for people who stutter. Significantly, one way to
address this problem of the emotional aspect of stuttering is to
demonstrate that even an infrequent overt stutterer can be
considered substantially limited in speaking. In fact, this part
will focus on this type of stutterer because of the law’s
heretofore lack of attention to this area. Still, there are
179

Id. at *5-7.
Id. at *6-7. The court seems to stress that Medvic stuttered frequently and
with great struggle, “at times rendering him incapable of verbally communicating for
himself.” Id. at *7. The court referred to the ADAAA: it noted that Medvic took medicine
to help him stutter less but that mitigating measures must not be considered, and it
explained that his stutter is substantially limiting even though it is episodic. Id. at *7.
181
Id. at *7.
182
Id.
183
Id. The court pointed to the ADAAA here to demonstrate that Congress
intended to broaden protections. Id.
184
Id. at *7-10.
180
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shortcomings of coverage in approaching stuttering as a
disability.
A.

Establishing Stuttering as a Disability Under the
ADAAA
1. Stuttering Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity

Under the ADAAA, a person who stutters may be able
to show that stuttering substantially limits speaking, a major
life activity under the Act. This would be an individualized
inquiry. But for the inquiry to be proper, it would need to take
into account both the physical and the emotional aspects of
stuttering. With respect to the physical aspect, the law already
accounts for a certain sect of the stuttering population.185 People
who stutter frequently should be able to show that their
disfluencies are substantially limiting, while people who
stutter infrequently would not be able show that their speech
impediments substantially limit their speaking.
The law, however, has not accounted for the emotional
aspect of stuttering. Nevertheless, stutterers who are greatly
affected by the emotional aspect of stuttering should also be
able to show that they are substantially limited in a major life
activity. Stuttering can be quite debilitating for an individual,
even if an outside listener does not hear many physical
stuttered words.186 This mental struggle, while less overt, can
nevertheless be substantially limiting. Significantly, the ADA
does cover mental disabilities in addition to physical
disabilities.187 Like certain forms of mental illness, stuttering is
sometimes not readily apparent to the outside observer.188
Coverage for these types of stutterers is not only necessary to
seriously deal with stuttering, but it is also practical, as it is
possible to gauge the extent to which a stutterer is emotionally
affected by stuttering. Significantly, and rather than relying
upon the plaintiff’s testimony, there is a way for speech
pathologists to assess stuttering’s full impact on a person’s
quality of life⎯an assessment instrument known as the
Overall Assessment of the Speaker’s Experience of Stuttering

185

See supra Parts II & III.
See supra Part I.
187
See supra Part II.
188
While this note is not attempting to equate mental illness with stuttering,
the ADA does cover mental disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. II 2009).
186
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(OASES).189 Using the OASES would add a measure of
objectivity and uniformity to the task of assessing the
emotional impact of stuttering on one’s life. Although this type
of stutterer may be less likely to be discriminated against
because this person’s physical stuttering is infrequent,
qualifying as disabled is nevertheless important because it
would allow for reasonable accommodations.190
2. Regarded as Disabled
The third way to establish a disability⎯the regarded-as
prong⎯was included in the ADA to protect disabilities not
noticeable to the naked eye. Therefore, it is especially relevant to
stuttering. This provision was first included in the
Rehabilitation Act to protect employees who were discriminated
against whether or not they were recognized as handicapped
under the definition of the statute.191 In Arline, the Supreme
Court interpreted this provision to include an expansive
definition of perceived handicaps, finding that Congress was
concerned with “protecting individuals from discrimination
based on outdated and stereotypic laws and attitudes.”192
The third prong and its interpretation in Arline are
crucial to protecting claimants who suffer from a disability that
is perceived based on untrue stereotypes. So many of the
problems facing people who stutter are based on false
stereotypes and myths. Therefore, even if an employee is not
substantially limited by stuttering, his or her employer might
perceive the employee as being substantially limited because of
the prevalence of these preconceived notions of stuttering. In
this way, the regarded-as prong adds a significant layer of
protection to those who face discrimination on the basis of
stuttering. If, for example, a person is an infrequent stutterer,
the speech impediment may not be too bothersome, and this
189

See generally Yaruss, supra note 36 (explaining this kind of evaluation).
Returning to the plaintiffs in Zhong, Preacely, and Detko, perhaps they
would have fit into this category of individuals. We do not know, but they could have
been given a quality-of-life assessment. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. It
is also strange that these plaintiffs would downplay the limiting nature of the very
impairment on which they were bringing their disability lawsuit. Perhaps they were
covering⎯downplaying their speech difficulties in order to seem more normal. See
infra notes 226, 228 and accompanying text.
191
Allison Ara, Comment, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Do the
Amendments Cure the Interpretation Problems of Perceived Disabilities?, 50 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 255, 258 (2010).
192
Id. at 258-59.
190
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person may not be substantially limited in speaking. But, if an
employer hears this individual stutter and discriminates on
that basis because of a stereotype associated with stuttering,
this person would have a claim under the regarded-as prong.
This employee would not be entitled to a reasonable
accommodation, but if this individual stutters infrequently and
is not bothered by stuttering, it is unlikely that any
accommodation would even be desired.
Another instance of the regarded-as prong applying to
stuttering is if a person stutters frequently but is not bothered
by his or her stuttering. Such an individual would not be
substantially limited in speaking because this person would not
view stuttering as limiting. But, this person may still face
discrimination based on stuttering. Although this employee
may fail to qualify as a person with a disability under prong
one, prong three should provide coverage: this individual is
regarded as being disabled even though the individual does not
view stuttering like this. No accommodation would be
requested in this situation, as the employee would not feel
limited in speaking. This should not be a catchall for truly
severe stutterers, though. While it would be a fallback option, a
severe stutterer should attempt to show disability under prong
one so that he or she is entitled to reasonable accommodations.
B.

Determining a Qualified Individual

Once a claimant can establish disability under the
terms of the ADAAA, this person must then be able to show the
requisite qualifications for the position at issue.193 “The term
‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position . . . .”194 Deference is given to the
employer in determining which job functions are essential.195
People who stutter may find themselves in a “catch-22”
situation when speaking or possessing excellent communication
skills is an essential job requirement196: “If they prove they are
‘substantially impaired’ in speaking, they will not be ‘qualified’
for the job.”197 “On the other hand, if they prove that they are

193
194
195
196
197

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
Id. § 12111(8).
Id.
Parry, supra note 9.
Id.
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‘qualified’ to hold a speaking job, they will not be ‘substantially
limited’ . . . .”198 Either way, as the reasoning goes, such a
claimant would likely fail to make a prima facie showing of
discrimination if he or she is subject to an adverse employment
action.199 While this is a serious concern, it need not always be
true. Note that it may be easier for infrequent stutterers who
demonstrate that they are regarded as being disabled to show
that they are qualified for the job because there is no possible
catch-22 in that situation. At the same time, though, these
employees would not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.
C.

What Kinds of Accommodations Are Reasonable?

It is next necessary to examine what would be considered
a reasonable accommodation that an employer could make for
an employee who stutters.200 Under its definition in the statute, a
reasonable accommodation can include “job restructuring” and
“reassignment to a vacant position,”201 but the accommodation
cannot pose an “undue hardship” to the employer.202
There are several possible reasonable accommodations for
people who stutter. Presumably, if a person who stutters is
uncomfortable because the job involves a lot of speaking (e.g., if
this person is often on the telephone, needs to make
presentations, or is required to meet with clients), it may be a
reasonable accommodation for an employer to assign the
employee to another position that involves less speaking, or
perhaps change the current position to require less speaking. This
may make both the employer and the employee more comfortable.
Another example of a reasonable accommodation would be
moving an employee’s desk to a less crowded part of the office so
that it is easier for the employee to speak on the phone.203
A major issue regarding accommodations is disclosure.
Employees with disabilities that are not visibly apparent need to
disclose these disabilities to employers to be eligible for reasonable
accommodations. If an employer does not know about a disability,
the employer cannot possibly make any accommodations.
198

Id.
Id.
200
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
201
Id. § 12111(9)(B).
202
Id. § 12111(10).
203
Beth Bienvenu, The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is . . . The Perfect Job:
Tips for Getting (and Keeping) a Job, STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (Sept. 9, 2006),
http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/isad9/papers/bienvenu9.html.
199
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Stuttering is one such disability that may not be readily
apparent to supervisors. If a person is a covert stutterer or an
infrequent overt stutterer who is uncomfortable enough with
stuttering that this person would like the employer to make a
reasonable accommodation, it is also likely that the person is
uncomfortable with the idea of disclosing the stuttering. A
stutterer may be reluctant to tell an employer about his
stuttering because of the myths and stereotypes that pervade the
public’s understanding about stuttering. Certainly, if someone is a
covert stutterer, it is the fear and shame associated with
stuttering that is keeping this person in the shell.
Here again is a link with mental illness. Stigma and fear
of mental disorders make disclosure to employers risky, and
“[p]oor self-awareness or self-denial may also make disclosure
difficult.”204 Disclosure is “deliberate” and often “wrenching” for
people with psychiatric disorders.205 Perhaps ironically,
considering the purpose of the ADA, people with psychiatric
disorders fear disclosing their impairments due to stigma and
discrimination; by telling their employer about their condition,
such an individual “risks discrimination, teasing or harassment,
isolation, [and] stigmatizing assumptions about her ability.”206
Conversely, disclosure may be a positive step for people
with psychiatric disabilities, as it “may enhance self-esteem,
diminish shame, permit coworkers and others to offer support,
and even empower another individual’s revelation.”207 This
assessment of the positives and negatives of disclosure by
people with mental disabilities echoes the dilemma faced by
many covert or mild stutterers.208 If these individuals choose to
disclose, they may be entitled to accommodations, but they
must also come out of their stuttering shells. Ultimately, many
mild stutterers probably choose to suffer in silence. If they do
not discuss their stuttering with their family and friends, it is
probably unlikely that they would choose to do so with their

204

Christopher G. Bell, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Mental
Disability, and Work, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 203, 212
(Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds., 1997).
205
Laura Lee Hall, Making the ADA Work for People with Psychiatric Disabilities,
in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW, supra note 204, at 241, 258.
206
Id. at 259.
207
Id. at 260.
208
Such a comparison is by no means precise because stuttering is not a
psychiatric disability. It is relevant only inasmuch as mental disabilities and
sometimes stuttering would not be readily apparent to an employer. See supra Part I.
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bosses.209 And, if they do not choose to disclose, they should not
shirk any of their duties.210 Failure to disclose and discuss
reasonable accommodations with an employer combined with
failure to fulfill the duties of the job means that an employee
can be fired and left without any recourse under the ADA.
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF STUTTERING DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON IDENTITY RATHER THAN DISABILITY

Another way to proscribe discrimination on the basis of
stuttering is to view stuttering itself in a different way⎯not as
a disability, but as an identity characteristic. This part
discusses the ways stuttering is different from what is usually
considered a disability. It then introduces several theories that
demonstrate how stuttering might not be considered a
disability. This different way of looking at stuttering⎯as an
identity trait, not as a disability⎯can be covered under
antidiscrimination law under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.211 There are both advantages and disadvantages to
coverage of stuttering under Title VII. Among the advantages
is a second way to account for the emotional aspect of
stuttering; if all stutterers are covered under law, the problem
of the infrequent physical stutterer is abrogated. Another
advantage is that explicit statutory coverage of stuttering
discrimination would eliminate the need under the ADA to
show that stuttering is a disability and that the individual is
qualified for the job. Quite significantly, a further advantage is
that such a personhood characterization of stuttering may help
to empower people who stutter. Among the disadvantages are
that, under Title VII, there would be no accommodations for
stutterers, and the statute may be overinclusive and
unrealistic.
A.

Viewing Stuttering as Something Other than a
Disability

While enforcement against discrimination based on
stuttering can be analyzed through disability jurisprudence,
there is another way to approach this type of discrimination.
209

Note that someone who stutters only infrequently would only be entitled to
a reasonable accommodation if it was established that the emotional aspect of
stuttering is considered a substantial limitation on speaking. See supra Part IV.A.1.
210
Parry, supra note 9.
211
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2006).
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There is something strange about viewing stuttering as a
disability. It is not as though stutterers cannot speak or cannot
express themselves. They are physically able to say whatever
they want to say; what makes stutterers different from
nonstutterers is that it takes them longer to say things. This is
unlike what one usually considers a disability, when a disabled
person is completely unable to do a certain activity.212 While it
is true that stutterers cannot speak quickly, there is very
rarely any need to speak so quickly. Rather, it is society that
has determined that it is normal to speak without involuntary
interruptions and that it is therefore inferior to speak with
these interruptions.213 The theories of acceptance, transfluency,
and covering do much to inform this discussion.
Although stutterers commonly feel ashamed of their
stuttering and view it as a terrible burden, a growing number
of people who stutter are growing to accept it.214 This selfacceptance can begin with the realization that this is how one
talks and that one cannot ever fully change it.215 With this in
mind, acceptance can offer the option of a more self-fulfilling
and life-affirming mindset for people who stutter because it
eliminates the “shame, guilt and embarrassment that makes
speaking difficult.”216 Note that, under this philosophy, it is the
negative feelings that make speaking hard, not the actual
physical production of sounds and words.
Transfluency is one scholar’s extension of this idea of
self-acceptance.217 Under the concept of transfluency, stuttering
212

See JEZER, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing how stuttering differs from other
disabilities). But see Douglas C. Baynton, Bodies and Environments: The Cultural
Construction of Disability, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH 387, 388 (Peter David
Blanck ed., 2000) (discussing society’s role in constructing even such an “obvious”
disability as mobility impairment by providing the example of a person who cannot
walk but who nonetheless can move about freely in a wheelchair to the extent that the
“built environment” allows for wheelchair use, noting that “[a]n impairment-centered
definition of disability [which the ADA is modeled on] selects walking as a major life
activity and rolling on wheels as an inferior substitute necessitated by the inability to
engage in a normal life activity”). Still, though, stuttering is different: a person who
cannot walk is able to move about in a wheelchair, but a person who stutters can speak
intelligibly without any device or aid.
213
JEZER, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing the importance of time and listener
reactions to stuttering).
214
Stuttering Info, Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L STUTTERING ASS’N,
http://www.nsastutter.org/stutteringInformation/FAQ.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
215
See Yeoman, supra note 21, at 43 (describing the philosophy of the
National Stuttering Project, the forerunner to the National Stuttering Association).
216
Stuttering Info, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 214.
217
Cristóbal Loriente, The Demedicalization of Stuttering: Towards a Notion
of Transfluency, 3 J. STUTTERING, ADVOC. & RES. 131, 139 (2009).

1210

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:3

is viewed as a “distinctive feature or a manifestation of human
diversity, but never as a pathological symptom.”218 Transfluency
considers stuttering a “manifestation of diversity in speech
pattern, as being black, homosexual and left-handed are
expressions of diversity in race, sexual orientation and
hemispheric dominance.”219 According to transfluency,
stuttering is a “dramatically different speech pattern,” but it is
“as human—or as natural—as the fluent one.”220 The conception
is partially based upon the view that interruptions in
stutterers’ speech are not the cause of the problem; rather, the
problem is the social stigma that often accompanies those
interruptions.221 People who stutter are often banished to the
“closet,”222 the result of being faced with stereotypes and cruelty
from society—manifested in “disapproving gestures, looks,
mockery”—that results in “a personal identity associated with
pain and suffering.”223 Transfluency dignifies people who stutter,
calling them out of the closet to express themselves and live
freely.224 Therefore, transfluency theory holds that stuttered
speech is not worse than fluent speech; it is just different. Under
this conception, discrimination protection through the ADAAA
218

Id. at 131. Perhaps, though, such a characterization can more broadly be
applied to the concept of disability, blurring this note’s line of disability and identity.
See Baynton, supra note 212, at 387 (stating that “activists in the disability rights
movement and scholars in the new disability studies increasingly argue that . . . the
concept of disability is fraught with ambiguity and based on highly variable cultural
rules and values concerning the body, personal competence, social interaction,
individual responsibility, dependence and independence”).
219
Loriente, supra note 217, at 131. Employment discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is not banned under a federal statute. See Matthew Barker, Note,
Employment Law⎯Antidiscrimination⎯Heading Toward Federal Protection for Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 111, 129 (2009) (noting
that “Congress has made repeated unsuccessful attempts to pass the Employment NonDiscrimination Act,” a bill that would proscribe employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation). But, numerous states and municipalities have taken this
action, including both New York State and New York City. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296 (McKinney 2010); N.Y.C. CODE § 8-107 (2011). A state or municipality could
include stuttering discrimination protections in its antidiscrimination statutes before
this is done on the federal level in order to judge on a smaller scale whether such a
change is effective and meaningful.
220
Loriente, supra note 217, at 131.
221
Id. at 137.
222
Loriente uses this term: he argues that “medicalization” of stuttering “conveys
a lonely and marginalized way of living (symbolized by the metaphor of the closet).” Id. at
136. Loriente explains, “The way of life of those living in the closet is directed by lies,
secrecy, and silence.” Id. at 137 n.6. While closet certainly conjures connections with sexual
orientation, the concept is not out of place in the context of stuttering. Thus, this note will
use closet when appropriate, while acknowledging that the term may not bring with it the
exact same meaning that it has in the context of sexual orientation.
223
Id. at 137.
224
Id. at 140.
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makes less sense because stuttering no longer exists as a
disability; it is rather an element of an individual’s identity.
Another scholar proposes a legal theory that is relevant
in continuing the analysis of stuttering as an identity trait.225
Described as covering, “a subtler form of discrimination has
risen,” where discrimination does not aim at groups as a whole
but rather at the subset of the group that refuses to assimilate
(i.e., cover).226 Kenji Yoshino identifies a judicial bias towards
covering that he views as dangerous because of its perpetuation
of inequality, “what reassures one group of its superiority to
another.”227 Groups that society requests to cover are asked “to
be small in the world,” to accept inequality and a “second-class
citizenship.”228 According to Yoshino, everybody covers, there is
no mainstream, and “[i]t is not normal to be completely

225

Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 15, 2006.
Id. Through the lens of sexual orientation, Yoshino describes conversion
and passing as concepts that precede covering. Conversion refers to “attempts to
convert homosexuals into heterosexuals.” KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN
ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 32 (2006). Passing describes gay individuals living in
the closet. Id. at 69. Covering, then, refers to muting one’s identity on the axis of
appearance, affiliation, activism, and association in order to gain mainstream
acceptance. Id. at 79-80 (referring to gays “acting straight” as an example of covering).
While this is not equivalent to stuttering, it is possible to analogize. Conversion would
refer to the still-widespread attempts to speak fluently through speech therapy.
Passing, therefore, would describe the attempts to hide oneself as a stutterer⎯using
tricks to try not to stutter, the most extreme form of which is to become covert. See
supra Part I. And, covering, then, would refer to the way people who are open about
their stuttering still try not to stutter in certain situations where they believe it is less
acceptable, or how they continue to downplay the large role that stuttering plays in
their lives. Covering would also refer to the people who stutter so frequently that they
try not to talk: people know they stutter, but they try to be more “normal” by speaking
less. Interestingly, stuttering (as a condition in society) seems to be simultaneously
going through each of these three phases.
227
Yoshino, supra note 225. Theoretically, the accommodation model of
disability-discrimination law should protect disabled individuals from needing to cover.
YOSHINO, supra note 226, at 173. But courts have limited this accommodation
principle, instead continuing to prefer assimilation. Id. at 174-76. Interestingly,
Yoshino explains that courts have done this by interpreting the definition of disability
strictly, which the ADAAA is designed to change. Id. at 175.
228
Yoshino, supra note 225. Yoshino provides some examples of disabled
individuals covering—a visually impaired person who dresses well, does not use a cane,
and memorizes what she must read aloud, as well as people with mobility impairments
who “use able-bodied people as ‘fronts’” to travel with. YOSHINO, supra note 226, at 172.
Remember, though, that individuals with sight and motion impairments would have
difficulty covering because their impairment would tend to be obvious. This is not the
case for many stutterers, who can choose to not speak or be covert. Stuttering, then,
remains more in the passing phase, which is why explicitly enshrining stuttering
antidiscrimination provisions in a statute would likely help stutterers leave their
closets. See infra Part V.B. And note again how stuttering is different from other
disabilities, as it is easier to pass as a nonstutterer than to pass as lacking many other
physical impairments.
226
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normal.”229 Yoshino believes that the “free[dom] to develop our
human capacities without the impediment of witless
conformity . . . extends beyond traditional civil rights groups.”230
While stutterers do not constitute a traditional civil rights
group, Yoshino believes that this freedom of individual
personhood should extend beyond the traditional groups to
confront coerced conformity everywhere, blurring the view of
what it means to be normal and in the mainstream.231
B.

Coverage for Stuttering in the Civil Rights Act

The alternative view of stuttering would lead to coverage
of stuttering discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. This statute prohibits employers’ discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.232 These
categories are all traits or aspects of personhood with which
people identify but have historically been imputed with
inferiority by society. The statute would need to be amended to
cover stuttering: this would not work under the existing
framework.233 While a statute cannot directly change a person’s
outlook, explicit coverage of stuttering in Title VII would not
only affect the actions of employers, but it may also empower
people who stutter to discover more of their true potential.234
There are several advantages to covering stuttering
under the Civil Rights Act rather than under the ADA. Were
stuttering included in this category, the processes under the
ADAAA would be dispensed with (i.e., whether stuttering is
substantially limiting, whether a stutterer was regarded as
having an impairment, and whether a stutterer is qualified for
the job). This recognition would eliminate the catch-22 problem
229

Yoshino, supra note 225.
Id.
231
Id.
232
42 § U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (2006).
233
Alternatively, an entirely new statute could be created, like the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, which was enacted for age discrimination. The goal
is not Title VII coverage precisely, but rather a statutory scheme where stuttering need
not undergo the preliminary determination of whether it is substantially limiting for it
to be covered (as it does in the disability context).
234
See Yeoman, supra note 21, at 47 (describing one stutterer’s outlook that
stutterers need to hear other people stutter so that they can have role models). An
organization called Our Time Theatre Company strives to give young people who
stutter a safe space to express themselves and pursue their artistic abilities. Taro
Alexander, Our Time Provides Kids Their Time, 1 J. STUTTERING, ADVOC. & RES. 33,
33-34 (2006) (describing how “an environment of unconditional acceptance
transforms . . . fear and shame into confidence and self-esteem”). At Our Time,
stuttering on stage during live shows is allowed and encouraged. Id. at 35.
230
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of ADAAA enforcement. Plaintiffs would not need to worry that
they would be considered substantially limited in speaking and
thus not qualified235 for the job. Conversely, they would not need
to be concerned that their qualifications would prevent them
from being considered substantially limited. By changing the
way stuttering discrimination is conceived, employees would be
able to stutter as much or as little as they needed to—or
wanted to—fully aware that they are protected against
discrimination. And, furthermore, covering all stutterers would
solve the problem of taking into consideration stutterers who
are more affected by the emotional aspect of stuttering than
the physical aspect. In this way, the enforcement of
nondiscrimination in the workplace would be more easily
accomplished for employees who stutter.236
Another reason why the identity model of stuttering
antidiscrimination enforcement would be positive is that it
would encourage stutterers to come out of their closets.237
Congress’s automatic recognition of stuttering in a statute as a
trait protected against discrimination would more easily allow
for people who stutter to choose not to hide their speech. To the
extent that society wants to encourage openness, the personhood
model would likely go far in encouraging (and perhaps
accomplishing) it. In fact, research indicates that stutterers face
problems in the workplace not only because of discrimination
from supervisors, but also because of their own attitudes about
their stuttering.238 One study indicates that some stutterers did
not choose the career they wanted because of stuttering and
avoided jobs that required use of the telephone or making oral
presentations.239 Another study shows that 50 percent of
stutterers looked for jobs requiring little speaking and 21
percent have declined a new job or promotion because of fears
associated with stuttering.240 Some people who stutter feel
trapped in an unwanted job because of their stuttering.241 This
235

Qualified in this context means that an employer could not say that a job
requirement of excellent oral communication skills requires nonstuttered speech. To be
qualified, the stutterer would, of course, still need to otherwise satisfy that
requirement and meet all other job requirements.
236
The relative complexity of the ADAAA model that this note proposes would
be disposed of. See supra Part IV.
237
See supra note 222.
238
Klein & Hood, supra note 41, at 256.
239
Id. at 257 (citing R. Hayhow et al., Stammering and Therapy Views of
People Who Stammer, 27 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 1 (2002)).
240
Id. at 266.
241
Id. at 267.
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indicates the extent to which stutterers limit themselves in
regards to their own employment opportunities. The changing of
attitudes like these will ultimately be necessary in order for
stutterers to reach their full employment capabilities.
There are also drawbacks to this identity model of
stuttering. Because stuttering is a variable trait, the ADAAA
may work better; under the substantially limits conception,
courts would understandably find people who stutter severely
to be disabled, and people who stutter mildly not to be
disabled.242 This personhood theory would be overinclusive in
that it would cover stutterers who stutter rarely and at the
same time are not emotionally affected by stuttering.243 Also,
perhaps some stutterers have such severe impediments or
conditions that they are not realistically employable;
companies may have business reasons not to hire a severe
stutterer. Under the ADAAA, such an individual would not be
covered because he or she would not be qualified for the job.
Under Title VII, coverage would depend upon the way the
statutory amendment is laid out;244 it’s more likely here, though,
than under the ADAAA, that this person would be covered, as
the identity theory rests on a modicum of acceptance of
stuttering in the society at large that is probably not yet
present in the culture. But Title VII does not cover
everything.245 Accordingly, a public-safety exception for
stuttering may be advisable; stutterers may be ill-suited for
certain jobs that depend upon rate of speed in talking (e.g., airtraffic controller).246 Furthermore, under Title VII, stutterers
242

This individualized inquiry would make sense if the level of severity took
into account both the physical and emotional aspects of stuttering. But if courts only
looked at frequency of stutters, rather than at how much stuttering affects a person
holistically, employees would too frequently be mischaracterized. See supra Part I.
243
Some kind of medical diagnosis of stuttering would probably be a wise
requirement here, so that individuals who do not stutter do not take advantage of this
new statutory provision.
244
The McDonnell-Douglas test would still apply. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 53, at 37-42.
245
Title VII permits classifications on the basis of “religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise.” RUTHERGLEN, supra note 53, at 129 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006)). This provision, known as the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ), does not include race. Id. The BFOQ, though, has been
interpreted very narrowly. Id. at 129, 143.
246
And, if the statute were written in a less progressive way, there could be
other exceptions besides a safety exception. For example, perhaps employers of
broadcasters would still be able to discriminate, if the public would not accept the
transfluency notion of people stuttering across the airwaves. For an example of
stuttering being accepted on the stage, see supra note 234.
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would likely not be entitled to reasonable accommodation.247
While this makes sense in the context of the personhood
model,248 it would be impractical for a stutterer for whom an
accommodation would be very helpful. This lack of entitlement
to accommodation is a significant drawback because it is likely
that most stutterers would not suddenly come to believe in
acceptance and transfluency. In other words, many stutterers
at this point in time would likely want access to
accommodations because they will not be comfortable with
their stuttering.
Ultimately, while the identity model would be the more
effective way to counter discrimination, the disability model is
the more practical method of dealing with this problem at this
point in time. Stuttering discrimination conceived as a
disability can be covered under the existing ADA, while
protection against stuttering discrimination as an identity
characteristic would require Congressional action.249
CONCLUSION
Employment discrimination on the basis of stuttering is
an important issue to examine because it is widespread and
limiting for stutterers, and because there should be legal
protection for people who stutter. Coverage for stuttering should
include both the physical and emotional aspects of the condition.
One way for stuttering to be covered is as a disability under the
ADA. The recent amendments to the ADA increase the
likelihood that it would be covered. Another way for stuttering to
be covered is as an identity characteristic under the Civil Rights
Act. Both methods of coverage are compelling. While the Civil
247

This assumes that a Title VII amendment for stuttering would track race
discrimination, as there is no right to accommodation in that area. There is, though, a
certain accommodation right in Title VII regarding religious discrimination, so it’s
possible that a Title VII amendment for stuttering could include such an
accommodation. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 53, at 146-47.
248
No accommodation would be necessary if stuttered speech were just as
valid as nonstuttered speech—there would be nothing for which to accommodate.
249
Is there a third way to conceive of stuttering? Ruth Colker describes the
term “hybrid” as “people who lie between bipolar legal categories⎯bisexuals,
transsexuals, multiracials, and the somewhat disabled.” RUTH COLKER, HYBRID:
BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW xi (1996).
Regarding disability, she reports that the phrase “temporarily able-bodied” has been
used to describe the “transient nature of . . . disability status.” Id. at xiii. While Colker
focuses on categories like body size, perhaps this can describe stuttering. Id. at 165.
The variable nature of stuttering can cause it to greatly affect a person’s life at times,
yet not be any issue at other times. Sometimes this shift can occur over a period of
months or years, and other times it can occur within hours or minutes.
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Rights Act would provide broader protection, stuttering will
more realistically be covered under the amended ADA because it
does not require any further congressional action. In whichever
way, discrimination based on stuttering should be proscribed so
that people who stutter can more easily enjoy the full measure of
their civil rights.
Jared Gilman
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